(005) Nietzsche’s “Beyond Good and Evil”, One Paragraph at a Time

 

That which causes philosophers to be regarded half-distrustfully and half-mockingly, is not the oft-repeated discovery how innocent they are—how often and easily they make mistakes and lose their way, in short, how childish and childlike they are,—but that there is not enough honest dealing with them, whereas they all raise a loud and virtuous outcry when the problem of truthfulness is even hinted at in the remotest manner. 

 

-Philosophers lose their reputation on the basis of finding the truthfulness, not because they bombard the public with repeated mistakes ,but that chaos reaction on the truthfulness which still is not be found in the remotest  distance. 

 

They all pose as though their real opinions had been discovered and attained through the self-evolving of a cold, pure, divinely indifferent dialectic (in contrast to all sorts of mystics, who, fairer and foolisher, talk of "inspiration"), whereas, in fact, a prejudiced proposition, idea, or "suggestion," which is generally their heart's desire abstracted and refined, is defended by them with arguments sought out after the event.  

 

-They pretend to achieve the essence of truth and progress it in terms of  enlightenment from god's unknown power ,but in fact they just prejudice the event and defend one definition from their desire. 

 

They are all advocates who do not wish to be regarded as such, generally astute defenders, also, of their prejudices, which they dub "truths,"—and VERY far from having the conscience which bravely admits this to itself, very far from having the good taste of the courage which goes so far as to let this be understood, perhaps to warn friend or foe, or in cheerful confidence and self-ridicule.  

 

-They do not wish to be regarded as defenders of the truth they define. They get far from awareness of accepting mistake and courage to let their pose be understood or be an negative reference for friend or foe confidently or in self-ridicule. 

 

 The spectacle of the Tartuffery of old Kant, equally stiff and decent, with which he entices us into the dialectic by-ways that lead (more correctly mislead) to his "categorical imperative"—makes us fastidious ones smile, we who find no small amusement in spying out the subtle tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Or, still more so, the hocus-pocus in mathematical form, by means of which Spinoza has, as it were, clad his philosophy in mail and mask—in fact, the "love of HIS wisdom," to translate the term fairly and squarely—in order thereby to strike terror at once into the heart of the assailant who should dare to cast a glance on that invincible maiden, that Pallas Athene:—how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a sickly recluse betray! 

 

-The great achievement in philosophy Kant found does not felt or touched by himself and seems to be stiff and decent  equally comparing with achievements found by other philosophers. Kant entices us into his "categorical imperative" and we will never be interest in tricks of old moralists and ethical preachers. Moreover, he decor it in mathematical form and clad his philosophy in mail and mask like Spinoza did. To translate ''love of his wisdom' in a way by which the assailant who are salacious to the virgin could be saved, how much of personal timidity and vulnerability does this masquerade of a  sickly recluse betray!